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RE-PARTNERING AS A CONTINGENCY DEDUCTION IN CLAIMS FOR 
LOSS OF SUPPORT – COMPARING SOUTH AFRICAN AND  
AUSTRALIAN LAW 
L Steynberg*    
1  Introduction  
 
In South African law a claim for loss of support is based upon the maintenance 
obligation of the deceased breadwinner in lieu of a relationship of dependency.1 
Typical examples of such relationships of dependency would include parent 
and child, husband and wife, grandparents and grandchildren, and brothers 
and sisters.2 In this discussion the focus will fall on the second example 
mentioned, namely the relationship of dependency between husband and wife.3 
‘Actual’ dependency, or domestic economic subordination, is not a pre-
requisite.4 In modern households it is common to find both spouses in the job 
market earning a salary. The dependent spouse must prove that he or she had 
a right of support against the deceased and that he or she suffered a loss due 






*  B Juris, LL B, LL M, LL D, Associate Professor, Department of Private Law, University of South  
 Africa.   
1   Davel Afhanklikes 51-53; Visser and Potgieter Law of Damages 418.  
2   Visser and Potgieter Law of Damages 246-247 and n 34.  
3   See par 2 below.  
4   Carver 2005 QUTLJJ 3. Also see the statement by Gleeson CJ in De Sales v Ingrilli [2002] 212 CLR 
338 (HC) 347: “[I]njury can occur in circumstances in which there is no dependency. For example, it 
is now common for both parties to a legal or de facto marriage to have salaried or income-producing 
occupations. Each may expect to obtain financial advantage from the other, even where they are 
both fully able to support themselves from their own income, and are therefore not ‘dependent’ in 
any sense.”  
5   Visser and Potgieter Law of Damages 247. See also Santam Insurance v Fourie 1997 1 SA 611 (A) 
in which it was held that the children of a working mother, who had been killed negligently, did not 
suffer any patrimonial loss due to her death. The mother was under a duty to support her children, 
but she received more from the household money pool than she had contributed to it. It can therefore 
not be said that she made any contribution to the maintenance of the children.  
 




In Australian law the basis of a claim for loss of support is to be found in 
statutory law.6 Legislation exists in all Australian jurisdictions to provide a cause 
of action against wrongdoers for the benefit of the statutorily defined family of a 
deceased. The legislation aims to compensate those, who have been deprived 
of one upon whom they were financially dependent, for the loss of pecuniary 
support suffered as a result of the death.7   
 
In a case where a claim is submitted for loss of support8 by the spouse of the 
deceased breadwinner, the claim will be influenced by the probable remarriage 
of the surviving spouse. The reason for this is that remarriage gives rise to a 
new maintenance relationship between the surviving spouse and his or her new 
marriage partner.9 It needs to be stated upfront that the restricted references to 
‘spouse’ and ‘remarriage’ can no longer be accepted as wide enough to include 
all relationships of dependency that are recognised in our law. It is suggested 
that the term ‘spouse’ be replaced with the term ‘partner’ and that all references 
to ‘remarriage’ be replaced with the term ‘re-partnering’. The motivation for 
these suggestions will be given in par 2 below.    
 
It is clear from case law that re-partnering or just the probability of re-partnering 
has an influence on a claim for loss of support,10 but how large the extent of  
 
6 See Supreme Court Act 1995 (Queensland); Fatal Accidents Act 1950 (Western Australia); Civil Law 
(Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT); Civil Liability Act 1936 (Southern Australia); Compensation to Relatives 
Act 1897 (New South Wales); Compensation (Fatal Injuries) Act 1974 (Northern Territories); Fatal 
Accidents Act 1934 (Tasmania); Wrongs Act 1958 (Victoria).  
7   Carver 2005 QUTLJJ 2.  
8   In Marine and Trade Insurance v Katz 1979 4 SA 961 (A) 978-980 Trollip AJ refers specifically to the 
probability of remarriage as a contingency (or possible eventuality) in a claim for loss of income. The 
plaintiff was divorced from her husband a few months before the motor-car accident in which she 
was seriously injured. It does seem strange that the probability of remarriage was mentioned as a 
contingency in the claim for loss of income. It is rather a contingency which belongs to a claim for 
loss of support.  
9   Davel Afhanklikes 125; Visser and Potgieter Law of Damages 225; Koch Damages for Lost Income 
215; Peri-Urban Areas Health Board v Munarin 1965 3 SA 367 (A) 376D: “Marriage prospects are 
relevant because marriage would reinstate her right of support”; Constantia 
Versekeringsmaatskappy v Victor 1986 1 SA 601 (A) 614C-D. See also Carver 2005 QUTLJJ 2-3 
and De Sales v Ingrilli [2002] 212 CLR 338 (HC) on Australian law in this regard.  
10   Clair v Port Elizabeth Harbour Board 1886 EDC 311 318; Kennedy v Port Elizabeth Harbour Board 
(1886) 5 EDC 311; Waring & Gillow v Sherborne 1904 TS 340 350; Chisholm v East Rand 
Proprietary Mines 1909 TH 297 302; Hulley v Cox 1923 AD 234 244: “But the object being to 
compensate them for material loss, not to improve their  




this influence should be, is not always clear. According to Davel,11 the 
demands for fairness, justice and public policy requires that the widow’s claim 
for damages should not be influenced by her remarriage. In line with her 
sentiments are those who believe that the benefits received from re-partnering, 
or the probability of re-partnering,12 are res inter alios acta and should for this 
reason not be taken into account in a claim for support.13 On the other hand, 
the opinion expressed by Koch14 is that adjustments for remarriage are 
reasonable if compensation in a lump sum is understood correctly, namely as a 
fair price in exchange for the right to litigate further against the defendant.15 In 
spite of these academic opinions re-partnering or the probability of re-
partnering is taken into account in the quantification of a claim for loss of 
support.    
 
In this discussion the wider concept of family dependency will be discussed 
first. Thereafter a distinction will be drawn between the situation where re-
partnering is an actuality or the intention is real and the situation where re-
partnering is only a future probability.16 Of more practical importance for the 
quantification process is the distinction drawn by the courts between general 
and special contingencies, and whether the contingency of re-partnering will be 
regarded as the one or the other. After discussing this distinction, guidelines will  
 
material prospects, it follows that allowance must be made for such factors as the possibility of 
remarriage”; Paterson v South African Railways and Harbours 1931 CPD 289 300; De Wet v 
Odendaal 1936 CPD 103 107; Legal Insurance Company v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 617-618; Peri-
Urban Areas Health Board v Munarin 1965 3 SA 367 (A); Snyders v Groenewald 1966 3 SA 785 (C) 
790; Nochomowitz v Santam Insurance 1972 1 SA 718 (T) 726; Milns v Protea Assurance 1978 3 
SA 1006 (C) 1014.  
11   Davel 1989 De Jure 370, 372.  
12   In AA Tegel v Madden [1985] 2 NSWLR 591 (SC) 611 Mahoney AJ described the contingency as 
the capacity to marry and not as the probability of remarriage.   
13   Visser and Potgieter Law of Damages 226 n 156 and the authority cited. See par 7 below on the 
three Australian jurisdictions where the legislature has promulgated legislation forbidding the use of 
remarriage as a contingency deduction. This is also the position in English law – s 4 of the Fatal 
Accidents Act 1976. Boberg 1972 SALJ 150 is of the opinion that in a field such as this, where 
nothing is known and all is surmised, it is better not to speculate at all than to speculate one-sidedly. 
Also see AA Tegel v Madden [1985] 2 NSWLR 591 (SC) 604-605; Public Trustee v Paniens [1971] 1 
SASR 297 (SC) 300: “I think that the suggested deduction, apart from being abhorrent in treating 
women like cattle to be appraised, is also totally illogical. It is agreed that a woman’s revived capacity 
to earn is not deductible. Why should her revived capacity to remarry be deductible?”   
14   Koch Reduced Utility 329.  
15   Also see Koch 1986 JCRDL 221.  
16   See par 3 and 4 below.  




be given to explain the quantification process that needs to be followed. It is in 
particular during this process that the South African case law lacks predictability 
and certainty, and valuable lessons can be learned from Australian law in this 
regard.    
 
2  A wider concept of family dependency  
 
In light of several recent judgments on the extension of the traditional concept 
of family and ‘husband and wife’,17 as well as the wording of relevant statutes,18 
it is necessary to change the terminology used to describe relationships of 
dependency. It is therefore suggested that the wider term ‘re-partnering’ be 
used, instead of remarriage, whenever reference is made to a new relationship 
of dependency which could lead to a duty of support between the partners in 
this relationship. It should also be noted that these relationships could be 
heterosexual or homosexual.19 A duty of support is only acknowledged in the 
case of formally recognised relationships, which will now in terms of the new 
Civil Unions Act 17 of 2006 also include registered civil partnerships. It is 
thereby acknowledged that benefits from all recognised forms of ‘re-partnering’ 
should be included in a fair determination of the extent of the loss of support.    
 
17   Satchwell v President of the RSA 2002 6 SA 1 (CC); Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population 
Development 2003 2 SA 198 (CC); J v DG, Department of Home Affairs 2003 5 BCLR 463 (CC); 
Robinson v Volks [2004] 2 All SA 61 (C); Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund 
(Commission for Gender Equality Intervening) 1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA); Santam v Henery 1999 3 SA 
421 (A); Mlisane v South African Eagle Insurance 1996 3 SA 36 (C); Zimnat Insurance v Chawanda 
1991 2 SA 825 (ZS); Du Plessis v RAF 2004 1 SA 359 (SCA).  
18   See par 7 below for the wording of three Australian statutes. In SA law the new Civil Unions Act 17 of 
2006 is relevant. Also see s 31 of the Black Laws Amendment Act 76 of 1963 and the Recognition of 
Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998.   
19   See Robinson v Volks [2004] 2 All SA 61 (C) and Du Plessis v RAF 2004 1 SA 359 (SCA). Also see 
Australian statutory amendments to include same-sex partners – s 83 of the Discrimination Law 
Amendment Act 2002 (Queensland); s 57 of the Acts Amendment (Equality of Status) Act 2003 
(Western Australia); s 60 of the Law Reform (Gender, Sexuality and De facto Relationships Act 2003 
(Northern Territory); s 4 of the Wrongs (Dependants) Act 1982 (Victoria); sch 1 of the Relationships 
(Consequential Amendments) Act 2003 (Tasmania); sch 2.3 of the Property (Relationships) 
Legislation Amendment Act 1999 (New South Wales); s 23 and 28(2) of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 
2002 (Australian Capital Territory).  




The probability of remarriage or re-partnering obviously does not only apply to 
women, but can also be raised in the case of male claimants, should 
circumstances warrant it.20 In Australian law the courts usually refer to the 
‘marriageability’ of the surviving spouse when determining the chances of 
remarriage or re-partnering. Age and conventional good looks have traditionally 
been used as markers of the marriageability of women.21 A man who is 
economically dependent on his deceased wife finds himself in the same 
position, but such a case is much more uncommon and a man’s physical 
attractiveness has never, according to the author’s knowledge, been 
considered in South African or Australian case law.22 In spite of acknowledging 
that re-partnering as a contingency deduction should be gender-neutral, most 
of the examples and references in this discussion are of widows claiming for 
loss of support. If reference is made to a widow in this discussion, it should 
therefore be understood that this reference is used only for practical reasons, 
and that it includes all other partners in recognised relationships of 
dependency.    
 
3  Actual or intended re-partnering  
 
If the widow has already remarried or entered into a new relationship during the 
course of the trial, this occurrence is taken into account as a proven fact23 and 
no longer as a contingency,24 which is naturally characterised by uncertainty.25  
 
20   Davel Afhanklikes 127; Koch 1964 SALJ 216 and n 28; Koch Damages for Lost Income 217; Koch 
Reduced Utility 329; Carver 2005 QUTLJJ 7; Luntz and Hambly Torts 632; Cooke and Cooke v 
Maxwell 1942 SR 133 136; Herman v Johnston [1972] WAR 121 124.   
21   See De Sales v Ingrilli [2002] 212 CLR 338 (HC) 365: “Seldom, if ever, will a court be able to make 
any useful prediction about whether, or when, one human being will form a close emotional 
attachment with another…And it is never assisted by fastening upon some superficial characteristics 
labeled as ‘appearance’, ‘personality’, ‘credentials’ or the like and having the judge or jury base on 
those characteristics some estimate of ‘marriageability’.”   
22   Atkinson 2003 QUTLJJ 5/10.  
23   See Davel 1989 De Jure 370, 372. Also see Faulkner v Keffalinos [1970] 45 ALJR 80 (HC) 85: “If in 
fact any of such things occurs before the assessment has to be made, what would have been 
allowed for as a possibility has become an actuality: the risk of an interruption of earnings has 
materialized and a hypothetical deduction to be made in the computation of damages has 
crystallized.”  
24   Apart from the three Australian jurisdictions mentioned in par 7 below.  
 




According to Carver26 the impact of a claimant’s actual or intended re-
partnering on the assessment of the loss of support claim should be considered 
for the following reasons: (a) preference for certainty over speculation; (b) 
compensation as an overarching concept; and (c) preventing illogical 
outcomes.27   
 
The financial benefit that the widow receives through re-partnering is taken into 
account in calculating damages according to the theory on compensating 
advantages.28 The new relationship does not, however, necessarily mean that 
the widow automatically loses her right to a claim for loss of support.29 The 
income of the new partner and his life expectancy will be taken into account in 
the calculation of the extent of her claim.30 If the new partner is not able to 
support the widow at the same level as the deceased, the loss to the widow is 
deemed to continue beyond the date of the new relationship, though it is  
 
 
25   See Steynberg Gebeurlikhede 23-24 for a reference to the characteristics of a contingency.  
26   Carver 2005 QUTLJJ 4-5.  
27   See Budget Rent-A-Car Systems v Van der Kemp [1984] 3 NSWLR 303, 311.  
28   Koch Reduced Utility 325: “If the value of prospective benefits from the new marriage exceeds the 
value for old marriage then the widow has gained. There is no reason why this gain should not be 
offset against her past loss of support up to the date of remarriage”. Also see AA Tegel v Madden 
[1985] 2 NSWLR 591 (SC) 604-605.  
29  In Glass v Santam Insurance 1992 1 SA 901 (W) a widow remarried eighteen months after her 
husband’s death and got divorced three months later. Two years later and one year before the 
commencement of this hearing the widow married her third husband. The plaintiff argued that she 
nevertheless suffered a loss of support due to the death of her first husband, because her third 
husband was considerably less affluent than her first deceased husband. The Witwatersrand Local 
Division, however, determined that the widow’s right to claim for loss of support lapsed with her 
remarriage. The decision in Glass drew much criticism and was overturned seven years later by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Ongevallekommissaris v Santam 1999 1 SA 251 (SCA) 259. The court 
held that the remarriage of the widow before the hearing did not automatically dismiss her claim for 
loss of support. This factual happening will, however, play a role in the assessment of her damages. 
30   Davel Afhanklikes 126; De Wet v Odendaal 1936 CPD 103 107; Roberts v London Assurance (3) 
1948 2 SA 841 (W) 850; Legal Insurance Company v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 618; De Sales v 
Ingrilli [2002] 212 CLR 338 (HC) 352. Also see Goodburn v Thomas Cotton [1968] 1 QB 845 (CA) 
854: “It does not necessarily follow that if a widow re-marries, so far as dependency is concerned, 
her right to financial support from those who killed her husband necessarily comes to an end. 
Matters like the means of the new husband, or the potential husband, have to be considered. The 
question whether the marriage will last has to be considered. All the manifold chances and changes 
of life have to be considered. It is indeed a task which many judges have disliked and many people 
have said that judges ought not to be called upon to perform.”  




reduced by whatever support is likely to be obtained from the second or a 
subsequent partner.31    
 
 
4  Re-partnering as a future probability  
 
In applying re-partnering as a contingency, the court must firstly determine the 
probability of a subsequent re-partnering,32 and for this the court must consider 
the facts known at the time of the hearing. Davel33 refers to the following 
relevant facts based on South African case law: The age of the widow;34 her 
character and appearance;35 how long the deceased was happily married to 
her;36 the fact that she must provide for small children and that this limits social 
interaction;37 the fact that the widow may already have an intimate friend at the  
 
 
31   Luntz and Hambly Torts 632. Also see Hollebone v Greenwood (1968) 71 SR (NSW) 424 (CA).  
32   See Koch 1986 JCRDL 217: “A wife has at all times during her marriage the prospect that at some 
time her husband may predecease her and that she may remarry and derive financial benefit from a 
second marriage. While her husband lives the value of this chance is small. It may even be 
negligible, if not non-existent, for older wives and others whose remarriage prospects might for 
religious or other reasons be somewhat restricted. For many wives the fact of the death of the 
husband brings about a massive increase in the chance of remarriage and an according increase in 
the financial value of that chance. In the computation of damages it is the enhanced value of this 
chance which is being deducted when allowance is made for the remarriage prospects of the widow. 
If the widow has in fact remarried, then one may adduce evidence not only of this fact but also of the 
financial standing of the new husband.”   
33   Afhanklikes 125-126; Davel 1989 De Jure 370.  
34   Chisholm v East Rand Proprietary Mines 1909 TH 297 302; Bester v Silva Fishing Corporation 1952 
1 SA 589 (C) 600; Trimmel v Williams 1952 3 SA 786 (C) 793; Munarin v Peri-Urban Areas Health 
Board 1965 1 SA 545 (W) 557; Snyders v Groenewald 1966 3 SA 785 (C) 790; Milns v Protea 
Assurance 1978 3 SA 1006 (C) 1014; Shield Insurance v Booysen 1979 3 SA 953 (A) 966C-E.  
35   Paterson v South African Railways and Harbours 1931 CPD 289 300: “The plaintiff is a young and 
comely woman aged 29 and the prospect of her remarrying must be taken into consideration”; De 
Jongh v Gunther 1975 4 SA 78 (W) 81-84; Roberts v London Assurance (3) 1948 2 SA 841 (W) 850; 
Bester v Silva Fishing Corporation 1952 1 SA 589 (C) 600; Trimmel v Williams 1952 3 SA 786 (C) 
793; Legal Insurance Company v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 617-618; Munarin v Peri-Urban Areas 
Health Board 1965 1 SA 545 (W) 557; Snyders v Groenewald 1966 3 SA 785 (C) 790; Nochomowitz 
v Santam Insurance 1972 1 SA 718 (T) 725; Milns v Protea Assurance 1978 3 SA 1006 (C) 1014; 
Shield Insurance v Booysen 1979 3 SA 953 (A) 966C-E; Burns v National Employers General 
Insurance 1988 3 SA 355 (C) 364H; De Sales v Ingrilli [2002] 212 CLR 338 385: “[A]n evaluation of 
physical attractiveness is not normally made in the case of male claimants”; Luntz and Hambly Torts 
632.  
36   Legal Insurance Company v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 618.  
37   De Wet v Odendaal 1936 CPD 103 107; Bester v Silva Fishing Corporation 1952 1 SA 589 (C) 600; 
Legal Insurance Company v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 617; Munarin v Peri-Urban Areas Health 
Board 1965 1 SA 545 (W) 557; Snyders v Groenewald 1966 3 SA 785 (C)  





time of the trial;38 the widow’s point of view on a subsequent marriage;39 the 
fact that the damages received for loss of support may better her chances at 
another marriage;40 census surveys and statistics indicating what percentage of 
widows (of her age) will remarry;41 the respect the widow had for the 
deceased;42 and the general welfare and health of the widow.43 According to 
Davel44 the court and not an actuary, is in a better position to consider the 
above-mentioned factors in order to determine the probability of a remarriage or 
re-partnering.45   
 
790; Shield Insurance v Booysen 1979 3 SA 953 (A) 966C-E. See Boberg 1964 SALJ 218 n 43: “I 
devote no time to consideration of the likelihood of a widow with seven children remarrying.”  
38  Shield Insurance v Booysen 1979 3 SA 953 (A) 962E; Willis v The Commonwealth (1946) 73 CLR 
105; AA Tegel v Madden [1985] 2 NSWLR 591; Dominish v Astill [1979] 2 NSWLR 368 393-394; 
Mahoney v Dewinter (unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Court of Appeal, 15 March 1993). 
39   Legal Insurance Company v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 617; Shield Insurance v Booysen 1979 3 SA 
953 (A) 966C-D; Masiba v Constantia Insurance 1982 4 SA 333 (C) 344-345. Koch Reduced Utility 
328 comments that the courts do not attach much value to a white widow’s opinion about her 
remarriage possibilities, while they do in the case of black women. Such an approach would 
necessarily be contentious on the basis of the fairness principle in the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 1996. A similar unfair distinction made between male and female plaintiffs was 
observed by Carver 2005 QUTLJJ 7 in Australian case law. In Rodda v Boontjie (unreported, 
Supreme Court of Queensland, 27 May 1993) Byrne J allowed a 45 percent combined discount for 
general contingencies and re-partnering prospects, notwithstanding evidence of the widow’s 
disinterest in re-partnering after being assaulted and robbed by a subsequent de facto partner. 
However, in Kuhlewein v Fowke [2000] QSC 404 (unreported, 10 November 2000), Mullins J made 
no deduction for prospective future financially beneficial re-partnering, although the widower in 
question had remarried and separated before trial. The court accepted that the widower’s adamant 
testimony that he would not re-partner was influenced by the failure of his second marriage. In 
Knight v Anderson (1997) 17 WAR 85 the Western Australian Supreme Court rejected an argument 
that a claimant’s pregnancy subsequent to her husband’s death falsified testimony that she would 
never re-partner.  
40   Roberts v London Assurance (3) 1948 2 SA 841 (W) 850; Trimmel v Williams 1952 3 SA 786 (C) 
793; Burns v National Employers General Insurance 1988 3 SA 355 (C) 364. Contra Koch Damages 
for Lost Income 217: “[I]t would be inappropriate for the court to take account of the effect on the 
prospects of remarriage of the payment of compensation.”   
41   Chisholm v East Rand Proprietary Mines 1909 TH 297 302; Smart v SAR&H 1928 NPD 361 365; 
Roberts v London Assurance (3) 1948 2 SA 841 (W) 850; Legal Insurance Company v Botes 1963 1 
SA 608 (A) 617; Snyders v Groenewald 1966 3 SA 785 (C) 790. See Koch Reduced Utility 327 for a 
discussion of the use of statistics for the probability of remarriage by black women.  
42   Snyders v Groenewald 1966 3 SA 785 (C) 790; Nochomowitz v Santam Insurance 1972 1 SA 718 
(T) 726.  
43   Legal Insurance Company v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 618; Snyders v Groenewald 1966 3 SA 785 
(C) 790.  
44   Davel Afhanklikes 126.  
45  See Thomson 1988 De Rebus 68: “In the courts, the amount of the deduction is subjectively 
determined, after consideration has been given to such matters as the widow’s appearance, her 
personality, her financial circumstances, the number of children  





In AA Tegel Pty Ltd v Madden46 the Australian Supreme Court held that support 
from a de facto relationship should also be taken into account in the reduction 
of the plaintiff’s loss of support from the deceased:    
 
[I]t may be suggested that a de facto relationship is less likely to 
endure (or to endure for as long) as where the parties have entered 
into marriage. But just as courts have hitherto looked to declarations 
of intent to marry before the trial and to the fact of marriage before 
the trial, I believe they may look to other relationships akin to 
marriage both to ascertain the loss that has in fact been suffered to 
the date of the trial and to attempt the realistic evaluation of the likely 
extent of the loss into the future.47  
 
 With the above quotation in mind, one could rightly ask the question whether 
possible benefits from informal or de facto heterosexual and homosexual 
relationships should not also be taken into account in the quantification of a 
claim for loss of support. In terms of the new Civil Unions Act 17 of 2006 all 
monogamous relationships, whether homosexual or heterosexual, has the 
potential to be recognised some time in the future (once the partners choose to 
make use of the registration procedures) and for this reason benefits from 
these relationships should in principle also be taken into account.     
 
5  Quantification of re-partnering as a probability  
 
Once the court has, as a first step, completed the value judgment on the 
probability of re-partnering, the court needs to quantify this probability. Case 
law indicates a high level of uncertainty about how to quantify re-partnering as 
a contingency. The main reason for this is that the facts of each case are  
 
and whatever else the judge may consider relevant. It is, however, customary for the actuary to give 
expert evidence on the amount, not only of the value of the widow’s loss of support, but also on the 
amount of the deduction to be made for the possibility of her remarriage”; Howroyd and Howroyd 
1958 SALJ 74: “It is not usually possible for the actuary to enter into such delicate matters as the 
personal appearance and temperament of the widow – this is by tradition the prerogative of the 
judge – but in exceptional cases where the widow had, for example, been badly scarred, some 
adjustment to the deduction based upon averages is clearly required.”  
46   AA Tegel v Madden [1985] 2 NSWLR 591 (SC) 605.  
47   Also see Luntz and Hambly Torts 632.  
  




unique, so that one cannot attach much value to precedent. The endeavour 
remains to identify and provide guidelines from case law with as purpose, a 
more consistent and morally justifiable quantification of re-partnering as a 
contingency.   
 
The courts, in most cases, will either reduce the contingency to an amount,48 or 
they will express the value of the contingency as a percentage of the value of 
the loss of support.49 Where the court during the initial step considered facts, it 
is now obliged to venture ‘guesses’ in terms of the quantification process. 
According to Koch50 the court must give consideration to two factors during this 
process, namely the expected amount of years that the plaintiff will remain 
without a formal partner51 and the financial position of her next partner.52 
Should these factors not be specifically mentioned in court, something that 
incidentally happens frequently, it creates the impression that the court has not 
given these two factors any consideration at all. Koch warns that the   
 
…factors which influence the judicial assessment of the average 
duration of widowhood are commonly highly speculative and the 
court, it is respectfully submitted, should be astute not to allow minor 
considerations to assume undue weight.53   
 
In respect of the financial position of the next partner, it is expected that the 
widow would re-partner into the same social class as before and that her 
financial circumstances would also be similar to what she had with her previous 
partner.54 If the widow’s deceased partner had been a very wealthy man55 or a  
 
55   In Roberts v London Assurance (3) 1948 2 SA 841 (W) 850 Dowling J took into 
consideration that the deceased “was a man of earning powers above the average in his 
walk of life and that a second husband would probably not be so effective a wage earner”. 
Based on this he reduced the deduction for the widow’s probable remarriage from a third 
to twenty five percent.  
56    See Koch Reduced Utility 328-329; Howroyd and Howroyd 1958 SALJ 74: “An assumption 
which is implicit in the use of the average deduction is that by remarriage the widow will be 
afforded the same degree of support as she received from her deceased husband. In 
certain circumstances this might be a quite invalid assumption”.  
57   See De Sales v Ingrilli [2002] 212 CLR 338 (HC) 378: “[T]he defendant has the onus of 
establishing the benefits that may be obtained from future financial support. If the evidence 
suggests that the surviving spouse may not receive the same level of support from an 
existing or future relationship, it is the defendant who must bear the consequences.”  
58   Milns v Protea Assurance 1978 3 SA 1006 (C) 1014A-E.  
 




very poor one, it would obviously influence the court’s general expectation as 
explained above.56 The onus of proof rests on the defendant to prove the extent 
to which the widow will be financially benefitted by re-partnering.57    
 
Milns v Protea Assurance Co Ltd58 is one of the best examples in South African 
case law of the unfair result that contingency deductions can have if they are 
not judiciously applied. The widow was young and she and the deceased did 
not have children. Firstly, Watermeyer J found that a general contingency 
deduction of twenty-two percent should be made in lieu of the uncertainties that 
her future could hold. The result was that her claim of R130 000 was reduced to 
R101,400.00. He further found that “she is a very presentable young lady with 
no attachments and . . . [I] rate her chances of remarriage as high”. Based on 
this, he subtracted a further seventy percent from her claim, which left her with 
an amount of R30,420.00. The message the judge sent to this particular widow 
was that she should remarry as soon as possible in order to survive and that 
she should also marry a man with the same or better substance as the 
deceased. In reality the two deductions made by the court imply close to an 
eighty percent adjustment. Circumstances should have been very unusual to 
validate such a high adjustment, but apparently this was not the case in this 
instance. The financial position of the potential new spouse was also 
erroneously not taken into consideration by the court.   
 
55  In Roberts v London Assurance (3) 1948 2 SA 841 (W) 850 Dowling J took into consideration that 
the deceased “was a man of earning powers above the average in his walk of life and that a second 
husband would probably not be so effective a wage earner”. Based on this he reduced the deduction 
for the widow’s probable remarriage from a third to twenty five percent.  
56  See Koch Reduced Utility 328-329; Howroyd and Howroyd 1958 SALJ 74: “An assumption which is 
implicit in the use of the average deduction is that by remarriage the widow will be afforded the same 
degree of support as she received from her deceased husband. In certain circumstances this might 
be a quite invalid assumption”.  
57  See De Sales v Ingrilli [2002] 212 CLR 338 (HC) 378: “[T]he defendant has the onus of establishing 
the benefits that may be obtained from future financial support. If the evidence suggests that the 
surviving spouse may not receive the same level of support from an existing or future relationship, it 
is the defendant who must bear the consequences.”  
58  Milns v Protea Assurance 1978 3 SA 1006 (C) 1014A-E. 




In Shield Insurance Co Ltd v Booysen59 appeal Trollip J distinguished between 
the position of the widow in this case and that of the widow in Milns, where the 
first-mentioned was slightly older and had three children as well as an 
illegitimate child. Based on these facts he confirmed the finding of the trial court 
that ‘only’ a fifty percent deduction was necessary under the circumstances.60 
The fact that the widow in this case acknowledged that she would remarry, 
should the opportunity arise to meet the right man, probably resulted in the 
heavier weighting given in the determination of the range of the contingency 
adjustment.    
 
Also in Burns v National Employers General Insurance Co Ltd61 the court found 
that the widow’s claim for loss of support had to be reduced by twenty percent 
for general contingencies, which inter alia included the probability of divorce. 
Thereafter her claim was reduced by a further forty percent in lieu of the 
probability of remarriage.   
 
Trimmel v Williams62 provides another example of a particularly high deduction 
for remarriage amounting to approximately seventy percent. The court based 
this deduction on the following grounds: The claimant was a widow with capital; 
provision had already been made for the children; she was young and beautiful 
and there was a probability that she would remarry. Once again there was an 
oversight in that no mention was made of the financial position of the second 
husband.   
 
59   Shield Insurance v Booysen 1979 3 SA 953 (A) 966C-F.  
60   Also see Lebona v President Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1991 3 SA 395 (W) 398F-G where a fifty 
percent contingency adjustment was made for remarriage. On the other hand, the decision made by 
Holmes AJ in Anthony v Cape Town Municipality 1967 4 SA 445 (A) 45F was that “[o]ne is inclined to 
exclude any reasonable possibility of her re-marriage: it would need an heroic suitor to plight his troth 
to an unendowed widow beset with a quiverful of children”.  
61   Burns v National Employers General Insurance 1988 3 SA 355 (C) 364G-J.  
62   Trimmel v Williams 1952 3 SA 786 (C) 793A-E.  




The incorporation of statistics to quantify the probability of re-partnering must 
be handled with due caution by the courts. In Legal Insurance Company Ltd v 
Botes63 Holmes AJ found that statistics of remarriage   
  
…should not be regarded as a starting point, but merely as one of 
the facts, to be considered along with all the other facts – one of 
which is that Cupid is notoriously incorrigible and unpredictable.    
 
In Snyders v Groenewald64 Van Winsen J refers to various relevant factors, 
among others the fact that that the widow had four young children, as well as 
that her statistical probability of remarrying at the age of thirty-nine was 
determined at forty-two percent. Taking all of the above into consideration, his 
finding was that a twenty percent contingency deduction for her probable 
remarriage had to be made.   
 
Koch65 is of the opinion that as soon as a widow receives a large sum of money 
as compensation, it heightens her chances of re-partnering above the 
average.66 For this reason the contingency adjustment for re-partnering should 
be greater than currently suggested by statistics.67 It seems, however, as if 
courts are opposed to using statistics on re-partnering.68 In spite of this Koch69 
regards statistics as a useful objective method of dealing with the clear 
subjective considerations of the courts on the probability of re-partnering.70    
 
63   Legal Insurance Company v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 617G-H.  
64   Snyders v Groenewald 1966 3 SA 785 (C) 790A-H.  
65   Koch Reduced Utility 326.  
66   Roberts v London Assurance (3) 1948 2 SA 841 (W) 850; Trimmel v Williams 1952 3 SA 786 (C) 
793C-D; Burns v National Employers General Insurance 1988 3 SA 355 (C) 364H.  
67   See Thomson 1988 De Rebus 70.  
68   Legal Insurance Company v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 617; Schiffmann v Jones (1970) 70 SR 455 
(NSW) 463-469; De Sales v Ingrilli [2002] 212 CLR 338 (HC) 365: “Statistics may provide some 
basis for saying, in some cases, that it is more probable than not that, at some time after (say) 20 
years a surviving spouse will for a new relationship. The younger the survivor, the more likely may 
that be to occur. But, in very many cases, statistics will provide little useful guidance about the time 
by which it is more probable than not that it will occur.”  
69  Koch Reduced Utility 327-328.  
70  Ibid 328: “One must in any event express serious reservations about the subjective judicial 
assessment of remarriage prospects for widows from unfamiliar cultural backgrounds. White 
remarriage rates are very high compared to other social groups in South Africa and a white judge 
should be wary of overstating the remarriage prospects of a black widow.” Also see Masiba v 
Constantia Insurance 1982 4 SA 333 (C) 344-345.  




It can be stated that courts should be wary to regard statistics on the probability 
of re-partnering as a guideline, or even as a point of departure, in the 
determination of adjustments, but should rather regard it merely as one of the 
multiple factors that must be considered.71   
 
In general it can be stated that South African courts tend to give serious 
consideration to the probability of a widow re-partnering and they are inclined to 
make substantial accommodation for this. It is nevertheless true that the proven 
factual circumstances do not always warrant these high adjustments, especially 
if they are preceded by a general contingency adjustment.72     
 
6  Re-partnering as a general or special contingency  
 
The distinction between general and special contingencies justifies a discussion 
on its own,73 but for purposes of this discussion the following brief summary 
has to suffice:74   
 
(1) General contingencies are regarded as general for the reason that  
they could be present in the lives of all people at any time, for  
 
71  Legal Insurance Company v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 617: “[S]tatistics . . . should not be regarded as 
a starting point, but merely as one of the facts, to be considered along with all the other facts – one of 
which is that Cupid is notoriously incorrigible and unpredictable”; De Sales v Ingrilli [2002] 212 CLR 338 
(HC) 364-365 par 70: “Statistics may throw some light on some of the questions we have mentioned. . . 
But great care must be exercised in their use. What are the characteristics reflected in the statistics? Are 
those relevant to the present inquiry? Why can it be assumed that the individual will conform to the 
average? To apply a statistical average to an individual case assumes that the case has all the 
characteristics which, blended together, create the statistic.” 72  It is also inappropriate to make an 
adjustment for re-partnering as contingency together with another contingency, as was the case in 
Paterson v South African Railways and Harbours 1931 CPD 289 300. Sutton J reduced the widow’s claim 
for loss of support with fifty percent, taking into account her probable remarriage as well as the probability 
that the deceased would not have received all the increases which were incorporated into the calculations. 
It would in particular be problematic if an appeal were to be lodged against such a contingency 
adjustment. 73  See in general Koch Reduced Utility 149-162; Boberg 1964 SALJ 201-203; De Jongh v 
Gunther 1975 4 SA 78 (W) 80H; Milns v Protea Assurance 1978 3 SA 1006 (C) 1011E-F; Shield 
Insurance v Booysen 1979 3 SA 953 (A) 965F-966F; Parity Insurance v Van den Bergh 1966 4 SA 463 
(A) 477C-D; McIntosh v Williams [1979] 2 NSWLR 543 (SC) 554-558; De Sales v Ingrilli [2002] 212 CLR 
338 (HC) 348-349. 74  See Steynberg Gebeurlikhede 181-262.  
 




example death or sickness; specific contingencies are regarded as 
specific because they are primarily relevant in specific people’s lives at 
specific times, for example re-partnering or divorce.  
(2)  General contingencies need in general not be proven, whereas specific 
contingencies have to be substantiated by evidence, although not 
necessarily proven on a preponderance of probabilities.   
(3)  A general contingency deduction is usually low (at average ten per cent), 
whereas a contingency deduction for specific contingencies fluctuates 
(between five and fifty per cent) depending on the evidence and 
circumstances of the plaintiff.   
 
If one strictly applies the above-listed distinctions to re-partnering it has to be 
categorised as a specific contingency. The following two important guidelines 
should, however, be applied: (1) Evidence must be presented to validate re-
partnering as a specific contingency and (2) the percentage deduction for re-
partnering must be in proportion to the probability of its occurrence.    
 
7  Re-partnering as a contingency deduction in Australian law   
 
In three Australian jurisdictions the legislature has promulgated legislation 
forbidding the use of re-partnering as a contingency deduction in a claim for 
loss of support.75 These three jurisdictions are the Northern Territories,76 
Victoria77 and Queensland.78 The wording of these regulations is sufficiently  
 
75   Also see s 4 of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 in English law where similar provisions can be found. 
76   S 10(4) of the Compensation (Fatal Injuries) Act 1974: “In assessing damages in action, no reduction 
shall be made on account of ─ (h) the marriage or entry into a de facto relationship, or the prospects 
of doing so, of a surviving spouse or de facto partner or a surviving former spouse or de facto 
partner.”   
77  S 19(2) of the Wrongs Act 1958: “In assessing damages in an action under this Part, that is 
commenced on or after the commencement of the Wrongs (Remarriage Discount) Act 2004, no 
separate reduction may be made on account of ─ (a) the remarriage or formation of a domestic 
partnership; or (b) the prospects of remarriage or formation of a domestic partnership ─ of the 
surviving spouse or domestic partner, or a surviving former spouse or former domestic partner, of the 
deceased person.”  





wide to include both the traditional concept of marriage as well as other non-
formal relationships. In section 10(4)(h) of the Compensation (Fatal Injuries) Act 
1974 (Northern Territories) reference is made to marriage and entry into a de 
facto relationship. In section 19(2) of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Victoria) reference 
is made to remarriage and the formation of a domestic partnership, and section 
23A(2) of the Supreme Court Act 1995 (Queensland) refer to any new 
relationship. These prohibitions relate to not only instances where remarriage 
or other relationships are a mere probability in the future, but also to instances 
where it is a real or definite possibility. One could argue that in instances where 
re-partnering with real benefits has already taken place before the date of trial, 
the application of these statutory prohibitions will lead to double compensation. 
It is for this reason not suggested that similar statutory prohibitions be 
envisaged for South Africa, but rather that the judiciary applies it’s discretion in 
a fair manner according to the guidelines suggested at the end of this 
discussion.   
 
Apart from the three mentioned jurisdictions in Australia regulated by statute, 
the legal position in Australian law on re-partnering as a possible contingency 
deduction is to be found in case law, as is the case in South Africa. In a recent 
decision of the Australian High Court in De Sales v Ingrilli79 justice Kirby 
pointed out the changeability of the Australian judicial bench when it comes to 
the quantification of re-partnering as a probability or contingency.80 
Contingency adjustments for re-partnering in Australian case law vary from two 
percent81 to one hundred percent.82   
 
78   S 23A of the Supreme Court Act 1995: “(2) The court must not take into account any financial 
benefits that the spouse may receive as a result of a new relationship that the spouse may enter into 
after the assessment. (3) Subsection (2) applies even if the spouse intends to enter into a new 
relationship.”   
79   De Sales v Ingrilli [2002] 212 CLR 338 (HC) 391-392 par 150.  
80  Ibid par 151: “It might be argued that these variations merely demonstrate the infinite variety of 
circumstances proved in, or inferred from, the evidence of a particular case. However, another 
explanation may be that the estimation depends upon imponderable factors, that it relies too much 
on considerations of the personalities and attitudes of the judges or juries, typically after a short 
encounter with the plaintiff, when they engage in the re-partnering ‘guessing game’.”  
81   See Cremona v RTA [2000] NSWSC 556 par 64.  
82   See Willis v The Commonwealth (1946) 73 CLR 105 (HC).  





In Dominish v Astill83 Reynolds AJ declares that a position of moderation 
should be taken in terms of re-partnering in order to avoid acting unfairly 
towards the widow. In the recent decision in the High Court of Australia in De 
Sales v Ingrilli,84 this position of moderation was formulated comprehensively. 
Chief justice Gleeson distinguished between cases where the claimant had 
already remarried (re-partnered) and cases where remarriage (re-partnering) 
had not yet occurred. In the instance where remarriage had occurred, or where 
a marriage with a specific person was a definite prospect, the court could 
examine the circumstances of the particular case and make appropriate 
adjustments.85 Therefore, the remarriage did not automatically exclude the right 
to support.    
 
Where remarriage had not yet occurred, a double contingency had to be 
addressed: Firstly, the probability that the claimant would remarry and 
secondly, the probability that financial advantage would flow from this union. 
Chief justice Gleeson was of the opinion that the court’s subjective adjudication 
of both these contingencies would be speculative in nature and that even 
statistics would not sufficiently assist the court.86 The fact that these  
 
83   Dominish v Astill [1979] 2 NSWLR 368 (CA) 378F-G: “It has come to be accepted, and in my opinion 
correctly, that, although real and not nominal allowance should be made for the revived capacity to 
marry, such allowance should, in general, be moderated for fear of otherwise doing an injustice to 
the widow.”  
84   De Sales v Ingrilli [2002] 212 CLR 338 (HC) 352-353 par 27-31.  
85   Luntz Assessment of Damages 541: “[I]t is not the fact of remarriage, but the quality of the support to 
be derived from the new spouse, that is relevant to the assessment of damages. The court is entitled 
to take account of the means and circumstances of the second spouse, the likelihood of the support 
continuing and even the possibility of a third marriage and support from it. Thus even if, as in the 
case of a young widow, there is a strong likelihood of remarriage, allowance may be made in 
appropriate circumstances for the fact that the second marriage may not be financially so 
advantageous.” See Willis v The Commonwealth (1946) 73 CLR 105 (HC); Dominish v Astill [1979] 2 
NSWLR 368 (CA) 378B-C; Hewitt v Tonkin [2003] WADC 203 par [21] (unreported, 29 September 
2003).  
86   Also see De Sales v Ingrilli [2002] 212 CLR 338 (HC) 365: “Seldom, if ever, will a court be able to 
make any useful prediction about whether, or when, one human being will form a close emotional 
attachment with another. Statistics may provide some basis for saying, in some cases, that it is more 
probable than not that, at some time over (say) the next 20 years a surviving spouse will form a new 
relationship. The younger the survivor, the more likely may that be to occur. But, in very many cases, 
statistics will provide little useful guidance about the time by which it is more probable than not that it 
will occur.” In Jones v Schiffmann [1971] 124 CLR 303 (HC) 306 Barwick CJ specifically referred to 
statistics on remarriage and he held the opinion that they were irrelevant in claims for loss of support. 
Luntz Assessment of Damages 542 too doubts the accuracy of statistics on remarriage. See in 
contrast Dominish v Astill [1979] 2 NSWLR 368 (CA) 391E-G: “These [statistics], in  





contingencies were unpredictable, did not however release the courts from the 
obligation to take this into account. According to him, the uncertainties involved 
in the probability of remarriage were not greater or smaller than those apparent 
in other ‘vicissitudes of life’ such as unemployment, which usually forms part of 
a general contingency adjustment.87    
 
The majority finding of the court by justice Kirby88 was that in cases where 
remarriage has not yet occurred, remarriage or re-partnering could no longer be 
applied as a specific contingency, which tends to be higher than the general 
contingency adjustment. However, it was held that the degree to which 
economic advantages or disadvantages of hypothetical re-partnering remained 
relevant in the calculation of the loss suffered as a result of the death of the 
breadwinner, it should now be taken into consideration as part of the ‘standard’ 
adjustment (general contingency adjustment) for uncertain future events. The 
High Court determined that the general contingency adjustment, which 
incorporated re-partnering, should only be five percent:89    
 
Re-partnering is merely another of the many possible vicissitudes of 
life, namely that the claimant may enter an economically beneficial or 
detrimental relationship after the trial. It is therefore to be given no 
more weight than any of the other vicissitudes that go to make up the 
general discount. The ‘standard’ adjustment should not be increased 
to re-introduce the ‘remarriage’ discount by the back door.90  
 
my opinion, provide some assistance. I recognize, of course, that they can be used only as a guide 
to the statistically average, and must yield to the circumstances which govern the case under 
consideration. They do, however, indicate that the average rate of remarriage for say widows under 
thirty years of age, is high rather than low; and that, on the average, a widow under thirty has a 
better than even chance of remarrying within ten years. I see no reason why figures of this kind 
should not be used, with discretion and appreciation of their inadequacies, to provide a statistical 
context for the inquiry.”   
87   De Sales v Ingrilli [2002] 212 CLR 338 (HC) 354: “Allowance is to be made for the contingency of a 
financially beneficial remarriage, in the same way as allowance is made for the contingency of 
premature death, injury, unemployment or financial ruin. It is a chance which usually cannot be 
predicted with any degree of certainty in a particular case, but which, in the population as a whole, is 
not a chance that can be disregarded as insignificant.”  
88   De Sales v Ingrilli [2002] 212 CLR 338 (HC) 396-397: “The accurate assessment of economic 
benefits and losses from a hypothetical future relationship has been shown to be impossible and 
undesirable. What has been known as the discount for the prospects of remarriage is therefore no 
longer part of the law.”  
89  Ibid at 397.  
90  See, however, the minority judgment of McHugh J in De Sales v Ingrilli [2002] 212 CLR 338 (HC) 378-
388: “Accordingly in my view, this Court should not abolish the long  





   
 8 Conclusion  
 
The uncertainty and unpredictability in South African law with regards to the 
quantification of re-partnering as a contingency in a claim for loss of support 
can to a certain extent be addressed if the more moderate position of the latest 
Australian case law is followed. In terms of this ‘moderate’ position re-
partnering should be regarded as a general contingency if it has not taken 
place at the time of quantification. As part of the general adjustment for 
contingencies, the possibility of re-partnering will only increase the general 
adjustment if evidence is presented that increases the possibility of re-
partnering occurring above the possibility of any of the other general 
contingencies occurring. The adjustment for general contingencies should at 
average be below twenty per cent.  Re-partnering will only be regarded as a 
specific contingency if it has already taken place at the time of quantification. 
The specific contingency adjustment for re-partnering will be based on the 
future uncertainty of the effect of the re-partnering on the claim for loss of 
support. The future uncertainty refers inter alia to the lifetime of the new 
relationship and the financial position of the new partner. The extent of the 
adjustment for this specific contingency will be determined by the specific 
evidence presented to court.  If these guidelines are followed it will limit to a 
certain extent the discretion of the court in quantifying the claim for loss of 
support.    
 
 
established rule that, in a wrongful death action, the court must assess and value the chance of the 
surviving spouse obtaining financial support in the future from remarriage. Nor should the Court 
abolish the more recent rule that support from a de facto relationship is a matter that may be 
assessed and valued. Moreover, I see no advantage in subsuming the discount for future support 
under the rubric of general contingencies.” Also see the minority judgment of Callinan J in De Sales 
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